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Abstract 
Animal research remains a practice marked by controversy and moral dilemma. However, UK science-
society dialogues on the issue are increasingly managed via one-way transmissions of information which 
construct publics as passive and attribute their concerns to a lack of ‘correct’ knowledge. Challenging 
such assumptions, this paper questions how and why people actively manage their interactions with 
animal research through entangled practices of knowing and caring. Based on an analysis of writing 
from the UK Mass Observation Project, this paper explores difficulties and discomforts associated with 
animal research which can cause strategic withdrawals from engagements with the topic. In doing so, it 
extends existing concepts of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ (Rayner) and ‘strategic ignorance’ (McGoey) to 
develop novel concepts of ‘uncomfortable’ and ‘strategic’ care. Finally, in examining desires to respond 
to animal research, I engage with Haraway’s notion of ‘response-ability’ to introduce the concepts of 
‘responsive caring’ and ‘responsive knowing’. 
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Introduction
Dominant modes of examining the views of pub-
lics on animal research have tended to concen-
trate on assessing ‘what ’ publics know about the 
issue, weighing this against the scientific ‘facts’, 
and judging civic contributions as either scientifi-
cally congruent or not. Despite the thorough cri-
tique levelled at this ‘deficit-model’ approach to 
lay understandings of techno-scientific issues (Mil-
lar and Wynne, 1988), which, of course, often con-
cern more than just the ‘technoscientific’, such an 
approach persists in UK science-society dialogues 
around animal research. Seeking to address this 
situation, this paper instead explores the practices 
of knowing and not-knowing and caring and not-
caring about animal research, asking how knowl-
edge of the topic is perceived and negotiated and 
what role care plays in interactions with it. 
Through the recent emphasis on openness and 
transparency in animal research, a shift encap-
sulated in the UK via the 2014 launch of the 
Concordat on Openness on Animal Research (UAR, 
2014), societal concerns around the issue are, in 
part, cast as the result of secrecy in the bioscience 
sector (McLeod and Hobson-West, 2015; Mills 
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et al., 2018). Such explanations for the contro-
versy that animal research continues to generate 
lend to assumptions that publics are ignorant 
and reinforce the authority of scientific experts 
in ‘correcting’ an absence of knowledge on the 
practice and regulation of biomedical science 
in the public domain. For instance, Martinez-
Sanchez and Leech (2015) claim that a “lack of 
transparency and openness in many European 
research centres encourages misconceptions 
about animal research” (Martinez-Sanchez and 
Leech, 2015: 1). Hence, they determine that 
‘without reliable, authoritative communication 
from the biomedical sector, public understanding 
can be manipulated through “leaks” and “exposés” 
that do not accurately reflect either the rationale 
and need for the research or the ethical standards 
to which such research is held’ (Martinez-Sanchez 
and Leech, 2015: 1). In seeking to regain control 
over societal opinion on animal research then, the 
Concordat encourages bioscience institutions to 
better communicate with ‘the public’ about how 
and why they use animals. 
However, in considering not simply what indi-
viduals know (or do not know) about animal 
research but why this is so, this paper challenges 
assumptions that increased scientific or regula-
tory information will alleviate societal concerns 
around the practice (Festing and Wilkinson, 2007). 
Rather than judging levels of awareness or the 
‘correctness’ of knowledge held, in analysing 
writing from the UK Mass Observation Project 
(MOP), I question how and why people actively 
manage their interactions with animal research 
through entangled practices of knowing and 
caring. In exploring this, I examine difficulties and 
discomforts associated with the topic, such as the 
emotional toll of knowing, conflicting care obli-
gations, and civic (in)capacities to bring about 
change in this area, all of which may encourage 
or necessitate strategic withdrawals from engage-
ments with animal research. To understand the 
interrelation of knowing and caring around this 
issue, the paper draws on concepts from the 
sociology of ignorance and care ethics. In doing 
so, it engages with and, in parts, develops concep-
tualisations of (not) knowing and (not) caring to 
focus on the themes of uncomfortable knowledge 
(Rayner, 2012) and uncomfortable care, strategic 
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ignorance (McGoey, 2012) and strategic care, 
and finally, responsive knowing and responsive 
caring.
In contesting deficit-model fixations with 
public knowledge on animal research and empha-
sising the interwoven nature of knowing and 
caring, this paper thus also seeks to address the 
absence of care lenses in this area. Research on 
care practices related to animal research has 
tended to concentrate on the laboratory, with a 
favouring of ethnographic methods to explore 
how multispecies care relations emerge in such 
spaces (Svendsen and Koch, 2013; Giraud and 
Hollin, 2016; Greenhough and Roe, 2018; Friese 
and Latimer, 2019), which are often discussed as 
constitutive of a specific ‘culture of care’ (Davies et 
al., 2018). The achievement of a culture of care in 
bioscience facilities is encouraged by regulatory 
bodies. In the UK, this includes the government’s 
Animals in Science Regulation Unit (ASRU), which 
defines a good culture of care as “an environment 
which is informed by societal expectations of 
respectful and humane attitudes towards animals 
used in research” (ASRU, 2015: 4). As notable in this 
definition, wider societal values around the appro-
priate treatment of animals are taken as informing 
care relationships in the laboratory. However, to 
date there has been little attention given to how 
publics and representations of publics feature in 
such care networks. With focus directed inside 
the physical space of the laboratory in which care 
is emphasised as the performative product of a 
situated intersubjectivity, a “common existential 
corporeal experience” (Svendsen and Koch, 2013: 
124), how publics who rarely enter the labora-
tory space may care about and for those involved 
appears currently overlooked. 
Indeed, concentrating on knowledge, UK 
animal research advocacy group Understanding 
Animal Research (UAR) claim that because “much 
opposition to animal research is based on misin-
formation” it is “necessary to be open and informa-
tive in our public messaging about how animal 
research is conducted with ethical oversight and 
regard for the 3Rs” (UAR, 2019: 2). However, in the 
first instance, such narratives of educating publics 
on animal research presume that publics actually 
want to know. Yet, as this paper aims to show, 
relating to the scientific use of animals is not only 
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a matter of knowing but also of caring, meaning 
that how we manage our knowledge or ignorance 
of an issue is always also part of a practice of care. 
As van Dooren (2014) explains, the “obligation to 
‘know more’ emerges as a demand for a kind of 
deep contextual and critical knowledge about the 
object of our care, a knowledge that simultane-
ously places us at stake in the world and demands 
that we be held accountable” (van Dooren, 2014: 
293). In the case of animal research, this paper will 
argue that it is precisely the responsibility that 
knowing confers upon publics that poses moral 
discomfort and, for some, necessitates the act of 
turning away.
As I will demonstrate in this paper, what might 
look like detachment from the issue of animal 
research may instead reflect a negotiation of 
personal responsibility and (in)capacity for action. 
Such insights are important for those invested in 
fostering care for issues with widespread political 
and ethical ramifications, what some have termed 
‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973), those 
characterised by a plurality of definitions of what 
the inherent problem actually is. Given the tangled 
nature of wicked problems, the ways in which 
they are produced by and knotted with other 
problems, generating care towards their resolu-
tion can be fraught with feelings of powerlessness 
and futility. Recognising processes of knowing 
and caring as enmeshed in broader structures 
of power that prevent some from feeling able to 
engage in either practice thus unsettles the onus 
placed on individuals, instead directing attention 
to existing barriers to knowing and caring. 
Method: The Mass 
Observation Project 
Unlike the use of opinion polls which dominate 
the UK dialogue around animal research (Hobson-
West, 2010), this paper draws on a novel resource 
for rich and reflexive writing, the Mass Observa-
tion Project (MOP). Described as a “national life 
writing project about everyday life in Britain” 
(Mass Observation, 2015), the MOP maintains a 
panel of voluntary correspondents from across 
the UK, referred to as ‘Mass Observers’, who are 
engaged with through ‘Directives’, a set of ques-
tions or prompts on a particular topic. Directives 
span a varied range of topics and have been used 
to investigate a variety of areas, from gardening 
(Bhatti, 2014) to genetic modification (Haran and 
O’Riordan, 2018), but can all be brought together 
under the heading of ‘everyday life’.
In responding to Directives, the writing of 
Mass Observers can take myriad forms.  As former 
Mass Observation Director (1990-2008) Dorothy 
Sheridan (1993) describes, written responses 
may include “letter-writing, answering ques-
tionnaires, being interviewed, keeping a diary, 
writing a life story” (Sheridan, 1993: 34). With no 
single genre of writing proving to be the most 
appropriate, Sheridan (1993: 34) characterises 
those involved in Mass Observation as engaged 
in “the process of forging a new genre: the ‘Mass-
Observation directive reply’”. Although, of course, 
MOP writing is a relational product and, as Pollen 
(2014) indicates, “writing to MO is always solicited 
and consequently shaped by the nature of the 
questions asked and the contributors’ conceptu-
alisation of the larger project” (Pollen, 2014: 10). 
Given the MOP’s commitment to documenting 
the ‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’, Mass Observers 
may view their role in the Project as one of local 
historian, documentarian, or citizen journalist 
(Bloome et al., 1993; Pollen, 2013), situating their 
views in local and broader contexts and often 
incorporating those of others. This reflexivity 
and attention to positionality means that Mass 
Observers often muse over not only what they 
know but also what they do not (Kramer, 2014). 
In this way, MOP writing illustrates the plurality 
of narrative and knowledge, disrupting the privi-
leging of a singular, unified telling. Because of 
this, analysis of MOP writing calls for approaches 
which steer away from generalisations and quan-
tifications (Pollen, 2013), instead demanding 
attention to the particularity of MOP writing and 
its emergence within the wider project.
Though the writings of Mass Observers will be 
discussed in this paper as part of wider societal 
feelings towards animal research, it is pertinent 
to state that Mass Observers are not intended 
here to act as a proxy for ‘the public’. Indeed, this 
notion of the ‘general public’ is not neutral yet is 
often constructed in animal research dialogues in 
ways which falsely portray neutrality (Davies et al., 
2020). Rather, in offering analysis of MOP writing, 
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this paper aims to emphasise the necessary 
situation of Mass Observers in their particular, yet 
shared, ‘everyday’ worlds, demonstrating the rich 
insights that attention to the micro in the macro 
can generate for studies of how publics relate to 
science. 
This paper is based on an analysis of responses 
to the 2016 MOP Directive on ‘Using animals 
in research’ commissioned by the University 
of Nottingham, which received a total of 159 
responses (72 postal and 87 electronic). All 
accounts were initially read in their original state 
(as word-processed responses and hand-written 
responses which were photographed at the 
archive and converted into PDFs) and uploaded 
onto NVivo 12 to provide word search function-
ality and an easier handling of the large dataset. 
In analysing the accounts, this study takes a 
constructionist thematic analytical approach, 
which, as Braun and Clarke (2006) describe, 
“examines the ways in which events, realities, 
meanings, experiences and so on are the effects 
of a range of discourses operating within society” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006: 81). In employing this 
approach, I followed Braun and Clarke’s (2006: 
87) six steps of: 1) familiarising yourself with your 
data; 2) generating initial codes; 3) searching for 
themes; 4) reviewing themes; 5) defining and 
naming themes; and 6) producing the report. 
This allowed me to remain at a meta-analytical 
level, looking at themes across the MOP responses 
collectively and focusing on relational processes 
which structure interactions with animal research, 
such as knowing and caring.
In exploring the three dualisms which structure 
this paper, those of uncomfortable knowledge and 
uncomfortable care; strategic care and strategic 
ignorance; and responsive caring and responsive 
knowing, each section will discuss excerpts from 
the writings of different Mass Observers. Mass 
Observers will be referred to by the identifica-
tion numbers they are given by the Project and, 
in the aim of preserving their style of writing and 
formatting, when reproducing their writing here 
I have tried to include grammatical errors, typos, 
and paragraphing. Only spelling and grammatical 
errors that might seriously obscure the coherence 
of the extracts have been amended.
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In the first section of this paper, I discuss 
the ways in which animal research is bound 
up with caring for the self, other humans, and 
other animals. To make sense of these dynamics, 
touching on the tensions that can emerge 
between them in deciding whose care should 
come first, I expand on Rayner’s notion of ‘uncom-
fortable knowledge’ to account for its entangle-
ment with ‘uncomfortable care’. In the second 
section, I build on McGoey’s concept of ‘strategic 
ignorance’ to introduce the concept of ‘strategic 
care’ as a way of exploring how Mass Observers 
convey ideas of not wanting to know and not 
wanting to care. In expressing a need to withdraw 
from knowing or caring about animal research and 
the uncomfortable knowledge that it presents, 
I suggest that some Mass Observers appear to 
employ practices of caring and knowing strategi-
cally, prioritising some care relations over others 
or deliberately turning away from the issue. Finally, 
in the third section, I discuss MOP extracts which 
demonstrate ways in which the issue of animal 
research requires some kind of response. This is 
made sense of via new concepts of ‘responsive 
caring’ and ‘responsive knowing’, as a way of high-
lighting possible alternatives to the withdrawal of 
knowing and caring.  In doing so, I emphasise the 
centrality of acknowledging one’s responsibility to 
care and know and draw attention to the need to 
cultivate the ability to respond in such ways.
The problems of attending 
to animal research
Rayner (2012) describes ‘uncomfortable knowl-
edge’ as ‘disruptive knowledge’ (Rayner, 2012: 
113), that is, knowledge which is in tension with 
our simplified ways of understanding the world. 
Knowing about animal research can be disrup-
tive in that recognition of one’s complicity in and 
benefiting from the practice (i.e. as a patient or 
medical consumer), whilst knowing of the con-
finement and killing of animals involved, threat-
ens to disturb self-perceptions built upon care 
for and about non-human animals. In thinking 
with Rayner’s concept around the topic of animal 
research, I will introduce the notion of ‘uncom-
fortable care’, not as a counterpart to the former, 
but, rather, as an integral component at the core 
of uncomfortable knowledge. Indeed, because 
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As this Observer (A4820) suggests, animal 
research may prove a particularly difficult topic 
to engage with when writing from the position 
of a current (or future) patient. In sensing a ten-
sion between their values towards the treatment 
of animals and their reliance on medical interven-
tions as a cancer patient, this Observer’s quandary 
highlights how multiple subjects are implicated 
in caring about animal research. In this case, such 
care relations involve oneself as a patient, animals 
involved in medicine production, and loved ones 
whose welfare and wishes are here entwined with 
the patient’s own. In feeling invested or complicit 
in animal research through a reliance on medical 
interventions, knowing and caring about animal 
research can be distressing and raise tensions 
between one’s care priorities, unsettling hierar-
chies of whose care should come first.
Another Mass Observer (H1470) expressed a 
similar sentiment in writing about their depend-
ence on insulin and the experimentation with 
dogs involved in its development – 
Unfortunately, I am having to take commercial 
medicines daily to stay alive. I need insulin twice 
a day besides other medications. I do know the 
story of how insulin came about. It breaks my heart 
having to take this medication as I often think as 
to how many dogs were sacrificed and in severe 
pain , in order that this medicine be created. (Mass 
Observer H1470)
Similar to the previous correspondent (A4820), 
this Observer (H1470) expresses a sense of regret 
towards their continual use of a treatment devel-
oped through the use of animals. Importantly, 
this Observer’s feelings towards their insulin use 
suggests that the emotional distress caused by 
the use of animals in developing medicines is not 
necessarily lessened if said animal use was in the 
‘past’. Such insights complicate the assumption 
that transparency around the role of animals in 
medicine development will boost public support, 
as has been suggested in the proposal to disclose 
the use of animals in medicine labelling (Collins, 
2011). Rather, past or ongoing use of animals in the 
research and development of a treatment that one 
is now reliant on can still be meaningful and mor-
ally problematic to those who care about research 
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knowing and caring are entwined, so too are 
uncomfortable knowledge and uncomfortable 
care. It is due to our caring about others, both 
human and non-human, that knowing about ani-
mal research may be uncomfortable and, as will 
be discussed in the second section, for some, 
identified as an area to be avoided.
In acknowledging the role of care in motivating 
(dis)engagements with animal research, this 
section will outline three ways in which knowing 
about the issue may be experienced as uncom-
fortable. These involve the disturbing impact 
that knowing about animal research can have on 
existing care obligations we have for the self, the 
humans we love, and the other animals we love. 
In discussing how each of these care relations can 
make knowing about animal research uncom-
fortable, the messy entanglement of each in the 
animal research domain will be illustrated, compli-
cating assumptions about the mobilisation of 
species boundaries in constructing moral commu-
nities and obligations of near and far care. 
Caring for the self
In articulating discomfort towards the topic of 
animal research, some Mass Observers describe 
their own state of health as preventing them 
from knowing or caring about the issue. For such 
Observers, feeling too close to animal research, 
due to dependence on medical treatments pro-
duced through the use of animals, acts as an 
obstacle to caring about the issue. Feeling some-
what dependent on the scientific use of animals 
in this way meant that the Directive was a chal-
lenging topic for some, as the following Observer 
discusses –
This is such a difficult topic for me! l know that as a 
cancer patient for the last 11 years my treatments 
will probably, highly probably, been tested on 
animals and I love animals and believe that as 
creatures of the world they have a right to a good 
and free life. 
[…]
My views have changed, perhaps because of my 
condition and perhaps because my husband wants 
me to live longer. I try not to think too much about 
this when I have my chemotherapy. (Mass Observer 
A4820)
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animals, with certain species, such as dogs in this 
case, arguably having particular significance.
Moreover, being reliant on medications at the 
time of writing might make thinking about animal 
research not only uncomfortable, but further, 
unreasonable. In periods of acute or longstanding 
illness it may be difficult for individuals to consider 
their relation to the practice beyond an individual 
need for effective medical treatment. As can 
be inferred from the following Mass Observer 
(M5113), in times of ill health, broader thinking 
around medical consumption and animal research 
may be impeded –
It is not fair that some diseases get more research 
funding than others. It is not fair when medicines 
and treatments exist but people cannot afford 
to have them because companies want to 
make a profit as well as support research and 
development. But it is not a perfect world. All I 
want when I buy medicine is to feel better. If you 
want me to think more widely, ask me when I’m not 
ill! (Mass Observer M5113)
As captured here, broader concerns than simply 
the need for medical treatment when ill are raised 
by this Mass Observer (M5113), as they touch on 
the (un)fairness of funding priorities in biomedical 
research and access to healthcare. However, such 
concerns are drawn back to the Observer’s princi-
pal interest in the role of medicines to make one 
feel better when unwell. Significant here is the 
suggested difficulty to care about others when 
one needs to be cared for themselves, echoing 
Smith’s (1998) characterisation of disadvantaged 
groups who might be “too preoccupied with feel-
ing the need for care, or with the difficulty of pro-
viding it, to think of much else” (Smith, 1998: 16). 
Such analysis reveals that investments in one’s 
self-care, represented here in current or future 
medicine use, can pose an obstacle to caring 
about the process by which medical treatments 
are produced. 
Caring for the humans we love
As well as representing a way to care for oneself 
in current or future illness, biomedicine can also 
signify a way to care for the health of loved ones, 
with such care obligations, again, making know-
ing about animal research uncomfortable. In con-
ceding the need for animal research and the role it 
is said to play in producing and advancing health-
care treatments, some Mass Observers articu-
late a sense of being torn between their values 
towards the treatment of animals and their stake 
in (current or future) medical interventions. As the 
following Mass Observer (D2585) suggests – 
Just seeing written, or heard said, the term 
‘Laboratory Animal Research’ makes me feel very 
sad. Of course I realise over many years cures and 
treatment for many illnesses, some of which were 
terminal some years ago, medicines now widely 
used safely would not have been ‘found’ without 
long years of research and experimentation, 
and probably members of my family, friends 
and acquaintances have benefited from this 
research, but the poor animals that have been kept 
sometimes in poor conditions who cannot speak 
but have been used to find some of the cures, make 
me very emotionally upset. (Mass Observer D2585)
This Observer (D2585) opens their response to 
the Directive by expressing their sadness upon 
encountering the words ‘laboratory animal 
research’. They go on to acknowledge animal 
research as a facilitator of medical advances, 
which have personal significance, yet return to the 
mistreatment of vulnerable animals (“who can-
not speak”) and the emotional impact of this. The 
tension felt here between wanting the expected 
benefits of animal research, i.e. effective medical 
treatments, whilst also not wanting animals to be 
used in such a way means that they find thinking 
about the practice particularly difficult.
As suggested earlier, caring for one’s own and 
loved ones’ health through the use of animals in 
biomedical research is often tied to future imagi-
naries which may hold illness. In discussing the 
need for animal research to produce medical 
interventions which may safeguard against future 
illnesses, relations involving those whose care is 
legally obliged, such as children, were significant 
amongst Mass Observer accounts. As suggested 
in the following excerpt, the construction of 
animal research as a way to channel care to others, 
in current or future illness, can generate moral 
conflict –
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Not an area I have thought about, it is difficult if 
a loved one or I became very ill and no drug was 
available or a new on may be being developed 
then testing would certainly be considered 
however should animals be tested on, no oh what 
a dilemma. Feel I am not being useful in this topic. 
(Mass Observer C4988)
As suggested by this Mass Observer (C4988), ethi-
cal relating to animal research can be bound up 
with hypothetical and future-oriented modes 
of caring, in which lives are pitted against one 
another. In caring not only for one’s own health 
and wellbeing but also that of loved ones, it may 
be that using animals for biomedical research 
offers a sense of health security for potential 
futures and thus any resistance to this constitutes 
a failure to fulfil one’s caring responsibilities. In 
this way, the ethical problem posed by the (mis)
treatment of animals in biomedical research is jux-
taposed with the (mis)treatment of loved ones by 
depriving them of potential medical treatments. 
Using animals in research thus becomes a way to 
protect oneself and loved ones against the threat 
of illness. 
Therefore, whilst such interpretations of 
whose care comes first might initially suggest 
the pre-eminence of human needs over those 
of non-human animals, this analysis stresses the 
importance of familial bonds. This suggests that 
the ways in which we relate to animal research 
are not merely situated in Ryder’s (1989) concept 
of ‘speciesism’, i.e. the prioritisation of human 
interests above those of other species; rather, they 
are enmeshed within relationships which are inter-
personal rather than simply genetic. The assumed 
partiality to family members before unknown, 
distant, or indeed, different others, features often 
in the rhetoric of animal research advocacy organ-
isations. In pitting the lives of family members, 
particularly children, against the lives of research 
animals, such groups often construct the choice 
that publics have to make on the matter as one of 
either/or and life/death. This is captured succinctly 
in a billboard campaign by US-based biomedical 
research advocacy organisation The Foundation 
for Biomedical Research (FBR) which juxtaposed 
an image of a white rat, symbolic of the labora-
tory, with that of a young girl and asked its viewers 
“Who would you rat/her see live?” (see Harrison, 
2011). However, as illustrated, the use of animals 
for primarily human gain does not necessarily sit 
easy. Furthermore, as the following subsection 
will examine, the making of family and kin often 
transcends species boundaries and interspecies 
relations may hold a special importance. 
Caring for the animals we love
With a long history of keeping animals as pets in 
Britain (Ritvo, 1987), such human-animal relations 
are often marked by intimate, interpersonal bonds 
(see Thomas, 1983 [1933]). There is much research 
documenting the intimacy and legitimacy of rela-
tions between humans and their companion spe-
cies (see Cudworth, 2011; Fudge, 2008), and, as 
Charles (2014; 2016; 2017) claims, writings from 
the MOP also confirm the importance of interspe-
cies relationships. The strength and significance 
of such interspecies relationships suggests that 
practices of care towards those who are tied up 
with animal research, from the breeding of ani-
mals, the experimental process, to the expected 
outcome for patients and publics, are not strictly 
determined by species barriers. 
An example of the way in which companion 
animal relationships may shape how Mass 
Observers relate to animal research is illustrated 
in this correspondent’s (R4365) deliberation over 
conversations with friends or family on the topic 
of animal research. As they write – 
For me the subject has never come up. I think this 
is because we all have animals and to think of 
them being harmed is too much to think about. I 
am aware that this is a very ignorant view. (Mass 
Observer R4365)
For this Observer (R4365), animal research pre-
sents a conflict between their views on the treat-
ment of companion animals (the animals that we 
care for) and that of research animals (the animals 
that care for us) making this a challenging issue to 
contemplate. Implied here is that discussing ani-
mal research leads them to imagine their ‘own’ 
animals in the position of those used in the bio-
medical industry, a line of thought which takes 
an emotional toll, and indeed, is “too much to 
think about”. Empathising with research animals 
through imagining one’s companion animals in 
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their place thus illustrates the role of care in relat-
ing to animal research, with the interpersonal 
connections shared with those animals we love 
serving as a way to understand the ways animals 
are treated in biomedical research.
Yet, attached to this, identifying as an animal 
‘owner’ or ‘lover’ also means that confronting 
one’s complicity in animal research, despite how 
problematic and constrained such complicity 
might be, is uncomfortable and can threaten self-
identity. As Engdahl and Lidskog (2012) observe, 
”citizens evaluate the social meanings of an issue 
and the extent to which it threatens or supports 
their social identities” (Engdahl and Lidskog, 2012: 
707). Drawing back to ways of mitigating such 
discomfort, perhaps it is not surprising, then, that 
Rayner identifies four ‘tacit information manage-
ment strategies’ to mediate one’s exposure to 
uncomfortable knowledge all of which revolve 
around different forms of not-knowing: “denial, 
dismissal, diversion (or decoy) and displacement” 
(Rayner, 2012: 113). 
In this case, writing from the MOP reveals 
that some would rather turn away from infor-
mation on animal research which may unsettle 
existing care obligations we have for the self, the 
humans we love, and the other animals we love. 
The use of animals to produce new biomedical 
knowledge, a goal often treated as a universal 
good (Harris, 2005; and, for critique, see Callahan, 
2003), is therefore disruptive in Rayner’s sense in 
that it troubles such simplified understandings of 
ourselves. That is, how can we love animals whilst 
also causing them to suffer? In perceiving a lack 
of options to resolve the discomfort generated by 
the topic of animal research, as will be discussed 
in the following section, strategic ignorance of 
the issue becomes understandable and perhaps 
required. 
Strategic care and 
strategic ignorance 
In responding to the uncomfortable knowledge 
that animal research presents, some Mass Observ-
ers appear to employ practices of caring and 
knowing strategically, erecting care boundaries in 
which animal research is excluded or turning away 
from the issue. In exploring how caring and know-
ing are practiced around animal research, it is cru-
cial to also attend to the ways in which they are 
not. In doing so, this section will begin with what 
I will call strategic care, that is, practices of caring 
that are based in strategically drawn bounda-
ries, allowing one to justify channelling care in 
some directions over others. This concept is my 
response to McGoey’s (2012) notion of ‘strategic 
ignorance’, which is described as being used to 
preserve one’s internal harmony through “prac-
tices of obfuscation and deliberate insulation from 
unsettling information” (McGoey, 2012:555) and 
which will be explored in the second subsection 
through Mass Observer practices of not-knowing. 
Given the entanglement of knowing and caring, 
strategic care is used here to illustrate how prac-
tices of ignorance and denial are bound up with 
caring. Indeed, it is because we care that we may 
feel the need to turn away in situations where 
we feel powerless to act. Viewing McGoey’s con-
cept through the lens of care and analysing this 
through relations with animal research therefore 
reveals how caring practices can also be practiced 
strategically, being employed in ways which pro-
mote some care relations over others. 
Strategic care
Before examining how Mass Observers negotiate 
their ‘care-full’ (van Dooren, 2014) engagement 
with the topic of animal research, it is first impor-
tant to note that, for some, animal research was 
considered a low priority issue. In acknowledging 
disinterest or indifference towards the problem 
of animal research, its situation amongst many 
other socio-political issues that demand consid-
eration becomes evident and, alongside which, 
some Mass Observers deem it as of lesser impor-
tance. Such practices may reflect a strategic care, 
through which boundaries are drawn to preserve 
some care relations over others. This boundary 
formation around which issues warrant care is 
articulated by the following Mass Observers –
I am afraid that on the scale of issues, this is a low 
priority one for me. I am involved in so many issues 
to do with justice and human rights for people that 
I feel to be too preoccupied with this would be a 
kind of luxury when human tragedy is all around 
[sic] us. Having said that, however, I do believe 
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that a society which is civilised in its treatment 
of animals is also more likely to be civilised in its 
treatment of people, so I am aware that these 
things are not separate entirely. (Mass Observer 
S4743)
~
At the end of the day I do feel for any animals that 
suffer in the service of humanity, but there are a lot 
of issues in the world that I think are more pressing. 
And let’s face it, we didn’t get to be top dog on this 
planet by being nice to other species (or our own) – 
nor are animals, as a rule, nice to each other.
I just hope our scientific understanding and control 
over the natural world can advance to a point 
where survival does not demand that we make 
moral compromises. (Mass Observer T5672)
For both Mass Observers, caring about animal 
research is situated amongst other issues that 
demand care, and for the first Observer (S4743), 
animal research is ‘a low priority’ compared to 
what are deemed as exclusively “human trage-
dies” [sic]. When located within such a landscape, 
in which one’s care is needed in a plethora of 
directions, this Observer (S4743) regards atten-
tion spent on animal research as “a kind of lux-
ury”. Yet, this separation between humans and 
other animals is then unsettled in the connection 
made between the way a society treats both. For 
the second Observer (T5672), the exceptionality 
of humans is regarded as having been achieved 
through the struggle for survival that all ani-
mals engage in, with the biomedical use of ani-
mals reflective of a natural, evolutionary fight for 
dominance. When taken as representative of this 
species struggle for survival, animal research is 
therefore implicated as a low priority matter, with 
“a lot of issues in the world” considered “more 
pressing”. However, as suggested in the hope that 
scientific endeavours for human survival do not 
entail “moral compromise” [sic], there are ethical 
limits to species survival.
That for these Mass Observers species presents 
a boundary to care demonstrates that caring 
is not neutral or unproblematic. Rather, care is 
a limited resource and one cannot care about 
everything. To direct one’s care-full attention in a 
particular direction must mean there are sites and 
subjects left unattended to as a consequence. As 
Puig de la Bellacasa (2012) puts it, “where there 
is relation there has to be care, but our cares also 
perform disconnection” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 
2012: 204). This means that care is strategically 
enacted to support certain relationships at the 
expense of others. Given the necessary confines of 
care, using species boundaries to guide normative 
decisions about who and what we should care 
about reflects wider sociocultural values around 
who deserves our care. In the case of caring about 
animal research, then, anthropocentric discourses 
which shape many areas of our social worlds and, 
indeed, are foundational to the biomedical use of 
animals, may make one’s caring attention towards 
laboratory animals questionable when such effort 
could instead be directed towards humans. 
In this way, although animal research involves 
and impacts bodies across species boundaries, 
caring about issues which are often defined as 
chiefly ‘animal’ within anthropocentric contexts 
may be subject to particular scrutiny. Further-
more, that grief over animal suffering and death 
is still often felt as taboo, being historically ‘disen-
franchised’ (Stewart et al., 1989) and remaining 
acutely so in relation to particular animals (e.g. 
‘livestock’) (Pallotta, 2016), may also contribute 
to the de-prioritisation of the issue. As to care 
about animal research in the face of human 
suffering may be to affectively disturb the cultural 
hegemony of anthropocentrism. Although a lack 
of interest or care towards animal research was 
expressed only by a minority of Mass Observers, 
such disconnections with the issue are important 
to acknowledge as they reveal how the practice is 
culturally situated amongst other socio-political 
issues which call for attention.
Strategic ignorance
As was more common in the Directive responses, 
if those implicated in the practice are recognised 
as deserving of care, pressure to learn more about 
the situation may be felt in order to better attend 
to it. However, knowledge of animal research 
practices might be uncomfortable and, with a 
lack of routes to act on such knowledge (Hobson-
West, 2010; Pound and Blaug, 2016), perceived as 
ultimately futile. In these situations, ignorance 
may appear beneficial through the shelter it 
offers from disturbing information. McGoey (2012) 
defines this type of not-knowing as ‘strategic 
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ignorance’, which is “distinguishable from decep-
tion or the suppression of data by virtue of the 
fact that unsettling knowledge is thwarted from 
emerging in the first place” (McGoey, 2012: 559). 
Using the language of denial rather than igno-
rance, Cohen (2001) also discusses how we man-
age unsettling information. For Cohen, there are 
multiple types of denial however most useful to 
consider here is his concept of ‘implicatory denial’ 
– denial of the implications of knowledge. As 
Cohen states, “unlike literal or interpretive denial, 
knowledge itself is not at issue, but doing the 
‘right’ thing with this knowledge” (Cohen, 2001: 9). 
In this case, Cohen writes that “we turn away from 
our insights and hide their implications. We half-
know, but don’t want to discover the other half” 
(Cohen, 2001: 34).
As both ways of conceptualising practices of 
not-knowing suggest, individuals are not entirely 
absent of knowledge about issues they strate-
gically ignore or deny. Rather, what one knows 
about a subject may fuel a desire to not know 
any more about it. This half-knowing and half-
not-wanting-to-know is demonstrated in the 
following Mass Observer’s (B3227) writing on the 
proposal of increased openness around animal 
research, in which they consider –
If we were asked flat out, Do you approve of 
secrecy? Are you in favour of greater openness?, we 
would say no and yes, but the truth is that some of 
us, and some part of all of us, are essentially happy 
to be kept in the dark about unpleasant things. 
(Mass Observer B3227)
This Mass Observer (B3227) acknowledges a cul-
tural valorisation of openness and consequent 
disapproval of secrecy, yet, in an almost confes-
sional tone, claims that such support for openness 
exists alongside a willingness to remain unaware 
of “unpleasant” knowledge. In these circum-
stances, openness is presented as harmful and 
secrecy becomes an act of public protection. Such 
theorising reframes ignorance and denial as ordi-
nary, everyday practices, which, rather than being 
inherently negative, can be personally and cultur-
ally beneficial. Challenging the notion that igno-
rance is something to be eradicated through the 
gaining of knowledge, an epistemology underpin-
ning the classical enlightenment spirit of science 
(Bogner, 2015), such understandings of ignorance 
highlight both its social and psychological utility. 
When confronted with an opportunity in which 
one may come to know something about animal 
research and the topic is already associated with 
uncomfortable knowledge, the refusal to know 
more or engage with the implications of any 
knowledge acquired can thus be seen as a coping 
mechanism. Hence supporting Cohen’s claim that 
“what looks like denial is an accommodation to 
cognitive threat. The attack on your life assump-
tions is blunted, and threatening information is 
cut down to tolerable doses” (Cohen, 2001: 49).
A key component in Mass Observer withdrawals 
from learning about or discussing animal research 
is a reported sense of being unable to alter their 
relation to the practice, and, more specifically, 
their perceived complicity in it as a patient or 
medical consumer. Not only are there limited 
opportunities to act upon knowledge gained if 
it is found to be troubling, given the proclaimed 
necessity of animal models to biomedical 
progress (Barré-Sinoussi and Montagutelli, 2015) 
‘care-full’ relating with laboratory animals can 
be emotionally immobilising. Such fundamental 
discomfort around the prospect of benefiting 
from harming animals therefore troubles assump-
tions that awareness of regulation or the value 
of animal models will alleviate societal concerns. 
Hence, rather than encouraging an appreciation 
of animal research, as bioscience communications 
which aim to draw public attention to the use of 
animals in medicine development intend (UAR, 
2016), this conflicting investment in the promises 
of animal research may make it all the more crucial 
to turn away. 
As touched on in the introduction, there 
remains a strong leaning towards deficit-model 
approaches to publics in the animal research 
domain. Indeed, previous arguments made on 
the subject of openness around animal research 
have claimed that publics wish to remain wilfully 
ignorant and thus providing more information 
on the practice has at times been discouraged 
(Aziz et al., 2011:459). However, such characteri-
sation of an ‘ignorance is bliss’ attitude of publics 
simplifies the ambivalence felt towards animal 
research. As this analysis of MOP writing shows, 
due to their caring about those implicated in the 
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practice, some individuals feel guilt and shame 
over knowing and thinking about animal research 
and also not knowing or thinking about it. This is 
demonstrated in the MOP excerpt below –   
As regards buying and taking medicines, I don’t 
think I have ever given the scientific research 
involving millions of animals a second thought 
which I suppose is rather shameful. It’s just 
something I block out I suppose – back to my 
feeling of not being able to do anything about it 
(Mass Observer F890)
The sense of shame or hypocrisy expressed by 
this Mass Observer (F890) reflects how avoid-
ing information on animal research might help 
to minimise any discomfort the issue causes, yet 
knowledge of the practice itself cannot be entirely 
eroded. Therefore, at times, one is aware of turn-
ing away and sheltering from unsettling informa-
tion, a practice which may raise further feelings 
of guilt or shame. That such feelings accompany 
the avoidance of information on animal research 
illustrate that partial ignorance does not provide 
absolute shelter from moral trouble. Indeed, 
shame is intimately tied to our sense of moral-
ity, acting, in Scheff’s (2003) words, as “our moral 
gyroscope” (Scheff, 2003: 254).
However, implicit to such practices of ignorance 
is the power, or lack of, that one possesses to act 
upon what they come to know. In order to combat 
silence and denial around animal suffering, Wicks 
(2011) suggests that “cultural channels should 
visibly be in place [sic] to validate the sense that 
something can be done, inform you what this 
something is and enable you to do it” (Wicks, 2011: 
196, emphasis in original). However, with a lack 
of routes to affect change in the animal research 
domain, ignorance around animal research 
appears to offer protection from the uncom-
fortable knowledge the topic poses. Without 
autonomy in this area, individuals may feel that 
ignoring the issue is in their best interests.
Nevertheless, as the MOP excerpt above 
shows, self-protection from such information is 
not unproblematic. Rather, feelings of guilt or 
shame may accompany the acknowledgment 
of an active ignorance towards animal research 
and the suffering associated with the practice. 
Such guilt induced by turning away from animal 
research may also be attached to a perceived civic 
duty to engage with issues of social justice. Given 
the mounting attention placed on individuals to 
take responsibility for global challenges such as 
climate change (see Whitmarsh et al., 2011), for 
some Mass Observers, animal research may reflect 
yet another political or ethical issue that citizens 
feel obligated to engage with, yet also disempow-
ered by.
Therefore, as this analysis of MOP writings 
on animal research suggests, practices of not-
knowing do not necessarily indicate not caring. 
Indeed, active ignorance towards unsettling 
topics may be explicitly driven by care. Rather, 
turning away from the issue of animal research is 
here shown to be functional, protecting oneself 
from the negative emotional impact that knowing 
about animal research is expected to generate, 
particularly when individuals feel unable to act 
upon such information. 
Responsive knowing and 
responsive caring
Although, as indicated by the previous section, 
knowing and caring about those implicated in 
animal research can be internally and interperson-
ally disturbing, some Mass Observers suggested 
that knowledge about the practice can be a useful 
resource for themselves and ‘the public’ at large. 
As well as being supportive of openness on animal 
research, some correspondents described ethi-
cal futures which were dependent on individual 
accountability for those involved and discussed 
current acts of beneficence which acknowledge 
and attempt to remedy the non-human vulner-
abilities that human action can generate. In inter-
preting such writing, I introduce the concepts 
‘responsive knowing’ and ‘responsive caring’. In 
describing these practices as ‘responsive’, I draw 
explicitly on Haraway’s (2016) notion of ‘response-
ability’, describing an ethical awareness which 
primes us to be continually open to responding to 
and with others, “a praxis of care and response—
response-ability—in ongoing multispecies world-
ing on a wounded terra” (Haraway, 2016: 105). 
In doing so, I hope to emphasise how such 
forms of caring and knowing are practiced 
through an acknowledgment of one’s responsi-
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bility to care and know and also draw attention to 
the need to cultivate the ability to respond in such 
ways. To be response-able, knowing and caring 
responsively, is therefore more than a personal 
ethical stance or sensitivity, it requires attention 
to power structures which empower and disem-
power us in varying ways. As Martin et al. (2015) 
put it, ‘the capacity to respond is itself unevenly 
distributed and enmeshed within complex config-
urations and logics of power’, a fact which means 
that ‘an ethic of response-ability, and thus an ethic 
of care, cannot be institutionalized or standard-
ized’ (Martin et al., 2015: 635). Therefore, in the 
animal research domain, it is my contention that in 
order for individuals to responsively care, oppor-
tunities to responsively know must be available, 
and so it is with the latter that this section begins. 
Responsive knowing 
In responding to the Directive, not all Mass Observ-
ers expressed an aversion to knowing more about 
animal research. Indeed, some expressed support 
for proposals of increased openness on the issue. 
Key to many of the accounts in which Observers 
were enthusiastic about more openness around 
animal research was the capacity for openness to 
bring about action. As the following Mass Observ-
ers indicate –
I have heard animal rights protesters say there are 
other ways of testing medicines + doing research. 
This is perhaps a taboo subject that should be 
brought into the open more. What are the other 
alternatives? Would they be as effective? The case 
was well made against animal testing for cosmetics 
so the debate should be moved onto health 
research more. (Mass Observer W3730)
~
I feel that it would be useful for the general public 
to know more animal research to help them decide 
what is acceptable. (Mass Observer H5741)
~
I think their ought to be more openness about 
animal research. At least not just to say who does 
it but to be able to legitimately justify it. If the 
same trials & tests can be done without animals 
but it costs more then I think so be it. Profit should 
not come before animal welfare. (Mass Observer 
G4296)
For these Observers, proposals to increase open-
ness around animal research should enable pub-
lics to act in some way. This can be seen in how 
the first Observer (W3730) links openness around 
alternatives to fostering debate on the topic, the 
second (H5741) calls for information which will 
enable publics to make informed decisions on 
which kinds of research are “acceptable”, and the 
third Observer (G4296) emphasises the impor-
tance of openness strategies which justify the 
scientific use of animals. In each of these excerpts 
the availability of such information in and of itself 
is not the key focus, rather, significance is placed 
on what agency such information could bestow 
upon publics in this domain. Information that 
enables publics to draw boundaries between nec-
essary and unnecessary, humane or inhumane, 
and acceptable or unacceptable biomedical uses 
of animals is important in that it permits publics to 
be active co-constructors, rather than passive con-
sumers, of scientific knowledge. In this way, such 
knowing becomes responsive in that it allows one 
to actively respond to the issue and be responsible 
for what one comes to know. Consequently, in 
providing routes for publics to intervene in animal 
research, such forms of knowing can be seen as 
facilitating ways to care for laboratory animals. In 
other words, responsive knowing enables respon-
sive caring. 
Yet, making certain data available as a way of 
appeasing a public characterisation of the sector 
as secretive without also providing ways for 
publics to act upon such information falls short 
of this. As Moore (2017) summarises in another 
context, “for governance to be ‘adequately 
justified’, the state must take an active role in 
explaining, evidencing and defending decisions 
and actions” (Moore, 2017: 425). Although there 
is value for science communication in making 
scientific and regulatory information on animal 
research publicly accessible, relying predomi-
nantly on this approach and treating one-way 
enactments of openness as ends in themselves 
potentially undermines the Concordat’s aim to 
“build open dialogue with the public on the reality 
of the use of animals in research” (Williams and 
Hobson, 2019: 8).
A key element of enacting meaningful 
openness around animal research then appears 
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to be that such strategies work towards fostering 
reciprocal science-society dialogues around 
the practice. In doing so, openness becomes a 
mechanism which can enable publics to engage 
with the issue in productive ways, rather than as 
an end-in-itself. As the following Mass Observer 
(T1843) reflects, openness is not only about 
transparency from the sector which can then be 
witnessed by public spectators, openness also 
signifies that an issue is open to public involve-
ment – 
I think there should be total openness about the 
issue, just as there should be around abattoirs in 
fact. We should not flinch from knowing how we 
get from a to b: we become too protected from the 
truth about how we conduct ourselves in society 
in order to have what we supposedly want. As it’s 
an ethical issue, everyone should be involved in 
it, particularly when it comes to medical research. 
(Mass Observer T1843)
This Mass Observer’s (T1843) conception of open-
ness seems imbedded in a sense of societal duty, 
with awareness of the steps in our consumption 
chains (i.e. ‘abattoirs’) being constructed as almost 
a civic responsibility. Similar to the writings on 
not wanting to know discussed in the previous 
section, this Observer regards ignorance around 
animal research as a form of protection – being 
“protected from the truth”. However, in charac-
terising animal research as an ethical issue, they 
determine that everyone has an obligation to 
know about and act within it. This links back to 
the feelings of guilt and shame discussed earlier, 
with some Observers’ self-confessed practices of 
ignorance towards animal research perhaps felt 
as a shirking of the obligation to get involved that 
the above Observer highlights. Yet, as this section 
reinforces, in implementing beneficial openness 
strategies around animal research, such ways of 
knowing must be considered for how they might 
empower or disempower. 
Responsive caring
In considering how responsive knowing is entan-
gled with responsive caring, we will now turn 
to examples where Mass Observers articulated 
ways of caring about animals used in research. 
Although the Observers mentioned in this section 
may describe a current withdrawal from know-
ing about animal research, they can also be read 
as expressing a desire to respond to the issue 
through new, potentially subversive, modes of 
care. Though perhaps based in idealised visions of 
the future, such care relations centre on a trans-
formation of human relations with laboratory 
animals and non-human animals more broadly, 
promoting an ethics of care obligated not only by 
the individual, but by humans as a species.
An example of this type of responsive caring 
is demonstrated in the focus of some Observers 
on a vulnerability that all sentient beings share 
(in different forms), that of the ability to suffer. 
In discussing the relations between laboratory 
animals and humans, Haraway (2008) writes of 
‘shared suffering’, not attempting to mimic or 
subsume the suffering of others, what she calls a 
‘heroic masochistic fantasy’, but doing “the work 
of paying attention and making sure that the 
suffering is minimal, necessary, and consequen-
tial” (Haraway, 2008: 82). Such considerations 
require us to continually critically assess what 
comes from the suffering of laboratory animals, 
to prevent such suffering from becoming taken-
for-granted. Relevant here is one Mass Observer’s 
(J5734) contemplation of a utopian future which is 
marked by its lack of suffering – 
[…] if we’re imagining a future world, we’re 
imagining it without suffering, and so we stop 
the suffering we are causing. And if I am working 
towards a world in which there is no suffering, I 
need to stop allowing things to suffer on my behalf, 
and give up the pills. (Mass Observer J5734)
In envisioning a future “without suffering”, this 
Observer (J5734) identifies their consumption 
of medicines as an area in which they can take 
individual responsibility for the suffering caused 
through animal research. Such reflection on how 
the management of one’s vulnerabilities are 
entangled with the vulnerabilities of other species 
can be seen as leading this Observer to consider 
the responsibilities that we, as individuals and 
as a species, might bear towards other animals. 
Considering their accountability for the suffer-
ing of other animals in pursuit of human health 
advancements, the Observer concludes that they 
“need to stop allowing things to suffer on my 
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behalf, and give up the pills”, an act that requires 
not only recognition but also acceptance of one’s 
own vulnerability. 
Whether put into practice or not, such visions 
of the future reflect Puig de la Bellacasa’s (2011) 
contention that “the commitment to care can be 
a speculative effort to think how things could be 
different” (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2011: 100). The 
ethical importance placed on individual respon-
sibility here is central to Tronto’s (2012) notion of 
‘relational responsibility’, “where the fact of being 
alive and the nature of human vulnerability places 
one in relationships […] that produce responsibili-
ties” (Tronto, 2012: 308). Such corporeal vulnera-
bilities are vital in thinking about animal research. 
Indeed, that animals are so often used as models 
for human bodies (Ericsson et al., 2013), viscer-
ally illustrates the way in which vulnerabilities 
are shared across species. In the animal research 
context, caring about such animals is intimately 
entwined with caring for ourselves. 
In articulating ways in which research animals 
and non-human animals more broadly may be 
cared for and about, some Mass Observers directly 
challenged normative obligations to care first and 
foremost for humans. Such Observers were critical 
of the prioritisation of human needs as repre-
sented through the biomedical use of animals. For 
some, in enacting beneficent care, such as chari-
table giving, who they care about might be struc-
tured in explicit contestation of the obligations 
expected towards humankind, as the following 
Observer’s (R5682) charitable practices suggest – 
I don’t like the idea of any animal suffering and if 
I support/give to any charity it is always animal /
environment related. Makes me sound horrible but 
I would never give to a charity related to humans. 
We’re too selfish and have caused most of the 
problems in today’s world! (Mass Observer R5682)
That this Observer (R5682) justifies their aver-
sion to donating to charities “related to humans” 
by deeming the human species at fault for “most 
of the problems in today’s world” suggests the 
invoking of notions of deservingness in enacting 
care boundaries. Such musings on the activities 
of humans as a homogenous collective are prob-
lematic, neglecting cultures which do not practice 
ontological separations between humans and 
animals (Salmón, 2000) and disregarding how the 
category of the ‘human’ is infused with unequal 
power distributions (Wolfe, 1998: 43). However, 
given current emphases on the negative impact 
of humans as ‘a force of nature in the geological 
sense’ (Chakrabarty, 2009: 207), such articulations 
of care perhaps reflect shifting relationships and 
priorities of care in the Anthropocene, a cultural 
epoch in which human exceptionalism may, for 
some, begin to lose salience.
Overall, this analysis suggests that some Mass 
Observers want to know more about animal 
research and to care better for those implicated 
in its practice, actively responding to the issue in 
some way. In such writing, Observers speculate 
on ways to resolve the moral discomfort that 
the scientific use of animals causes, suggesting 
a desire for ways of knowing about the practice 
which enable intervention into it and modes of 
caring which may radically improve the lives of 
non-human animals, in science and elsewhere. As 
well as this, some Mass Observers relate to their 
membership of the human species, revealing how 
caring about animals involved in practices such as 
scientific research can play out on a macro scale 
and lead to demand for change to the ways that 
‘we’, collectively, enact care.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that relating to animal 
research is a process of both knowing and caring. 
In demonstrating this entanglement, I have intro-
duced the novel concepts of uncomfortable care, 
strategic care, and responsive knowing and caring. 
In the first section, the concept of ‘uncomfortable 
care’ was used to discuss why animal research can 
be an acutely uncomfortable topic, touching on 
the competing tensions it raises between different 
care relations. This expanded on Rayner’s ‘uncom-
fortable knowledge’ to more precisely account for 
why such knowledge is uncomfortable in the first 
place. Looking at how the uncomfortable topic of 
animal research is mediated in the everyday, the 
second section looked at Mass Observers who do 
not want to care or know about the issue. Here, 
McGoey’s notion of ‘strategic knowledge’ was 
used to interpret discussions of turning away 
from the topic. Accounting for strategic practices 
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of caring, McGoey’s concept was extended with 
the notion of ‘strategic care’, drawing attention 
to how some care relations are deliberately pri-
oritised over others. The final section attended to 
Mass Observers who want to respond to animal 
research through modes of what I have called 
‘responsive knowing and ’responsive caring’. Fol-
lowing Haraway’s notion of ‘response-ability’, 
these concepts suggest that knowing becomes 
responsive when it allows one to actively respond 
to the issue and be responsible for what one comes 
to know. In this way, responsive knowing should 
lead to responsive caring. 
Overall, this analysis suggests that the contro-
versy of animal research is irresolvable by 
increasing the availability of information alone. 
Indeed, as Bauer and Falade (2014) write, “if 
Francis Bacon’s late sixteenth-century notion of 
‘knowledge is power’ holds, any attempt to share 
knowledge without simultaneous empowerment 
will alienate rather than bring the public closer to 
science” (Bauer and Falade, 2014: 148). For animal 
research and other technoscientific controver-
sies, consideration of the varying capacities that 
publics have to act on what they come to know 
is crucial. Without this, those who care about 
an issue yet feel unable to act on the moral and 
emotional trouble it evokes may feel it necessary 
to turn away altogether.
In their discussion of the local ethical review 
process regulating animal research, Hobson-
West and Davies (2017) show that the regula-
tion of biomedical animal use is informed by 
societal concerns. Their work demonstrates that, 
in considering the impact a particular experiment 
may have, the ethical review process considers 
potential ‘harms’ to the human community outside 
of the laboratory as well as the non-human animal 
subjects who are directly involved. One might 
therefore argue that how future science-society 
dialogues around animal research are enacted 
should also be subject to similar consideration. 
Specifically, communication must be built upon 
care for how publics can make meaningful use of 
opportunities to know.
Furthermore, in considering the ethical and 
methodological implications of the analyses 
offered here, attention must also be turned back 
onto the origins of this research, the commis-
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sioning of the MOP Directive on ‘Using animals 
in research’. Although methods like the MOP 
offer anonymity and generous amounts of 
space, time, and formatting freedom, the preva-
lence of discomfort in Observers’ writing on 
animal research raises questions of whether such 
methods themselves evoke heightened levels 
of discomfort towards controversial topics and 
leave correspondents ‘alone’ at home to deal with 
this (Hobson-West et al., 2019). Such consider-
ations reflect that studies of societal relations with 
animal research are themselves forms of engage-
ments which ask individuals to confront the 
ethical trouble that the issue may generate.  
To end, Limoges’ (1993) point is pertinent to 
bear in mind for future work in this area. This is 
that when dealing with controversy, “the actors 
are not an audience, nor are they ‘students’ to 
be taught’, controversies are instead ‘learning 
processes” for all those involved (Limoges, 1993: 
422-423). Acknowledging this whilst mindful of 
the unequal distribution of capacities to affect 
change in this area means that how the question 
of animal research is raised in dialogical processes 
is of ethical as well as methodological significance. 
Thus, in going forward, it is hoped that attention 
to the diverse positionality of publics and their 
varying (in)capacities to respond to complex 
issues might help to promote communications, 
engagements, and participatory processes which 
empower actors to contribute in meaningful ways.
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